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The French Reception of Völkerpsychologie and the Origins of the Social 
Sciences 
 
I. 
The part that Völkerpsychologie played in the development of the social sciences has 
not been fully understood.1 In the second half of the nineteenth century, it 
represented a serious attempt to establish a “social science”, i.e. an academic 
discipline that would study communal life, as represented by the Volk (the “people” 
or the “nation”), systematically and comprehensively. In order to do so, the 
“founders” of Völkerpsychologie, the philosopher Moritz Steinthal and the linguist 
Heymann Steinthal, proposed to introduce methods as rigorous as those of the 
sciences to the study of the “collective mind”, or Volksgeist. In its heydays during the 
period of classical liberalism from about 1860 to 1890, Lazarus and Steinthal’s 
Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft provided a platform and 
an outlet for their new approach. After the demise of the journal in 1890 with the 
retirement of its editors, Wilhelm Wundt became the most pronounced “folk 
                                                   
1  Since there is no accurate English translation of the German term – contenders were 
“Folk Psychology”, “National Psychology”, and “Ethnic Psychology” – I will use 
Völkerpsychologie throughout the text. Upon the publication of the English 
translation of Wilhelm Wundt’s Elemente der Völkerpsychologie as Elements of Folk 
Psychology, the reviewer of the journal Folklore plainly dismissed the decision by the 
translator to introduce the “neologism ‘Folk Psychology’”. Wundt was really doing 
social psychology, he argued, and “to treat ‘folk’ as equivalent to ‘society’ or 
‘community’ seems an outrage on the English language”. See R.R. Marett, “Review of 
Wundt, Elements of Folk Psychology”, in Folklore 27 (1916), 440-41. 
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psychologist” and spent the last twenty years of his career writing a multi-volume 
Völkerpsychologie. Irrespective of its academic credentials, Völkerpsychologie was a 
symptomatic approach during a transformative period in German, and indeed 
European intellectual history: based on the idea of progress – both scientific and 
moral – and on the belief in the primordial importance of the Volk, it represented the 
mind-set of ‘ascendant liberalism’ in an almost pure form. The relevance and 
importance of Völkerpsychologie can be gauged from a list of scholars and 
intellectuals who discussed its merits as well as its problems: this list includes, but is 
not limited to, Georg Simmel, Harry Graf Kessler, Martin Buber, Sigmund Freud, 
Fritz Mauthner, Max Nordau, Max Weber, Wilhelm Windelband and Wilhelm 
Dilthey.  
Moreover, the impact of Völkerpsychologie was not limited to German 
authors. Even though few of the texts that constitute the core of this approach were 
translated, its reception reached well beyond the confines of German academia.2 In 
the United States, we find a member of the “Chicago School” of sociology, W. I. 
Thomas, referring to Lazarus and Steinthal’s works in an attempt to refute the 
“absurdities” of race psychologists, in particular the Italian criminologist Cesare 
Lombroso, who tried to identify and classify “criminal types” by studying their 
                                                   
2  None of Lazarus and Steinthal’s texts on Völkerpsychologie, which appeared mainly 
in the Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft, were translated. 
While many of Wundt’s studies on experimental psychology, on ethics, logic, and the 
history of philosophy were translated into French and English, only his one-volume 
Elements of Folk Psychology (London and New York, 1916), orginally published in 
1912, appeared in English. 
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physiognomy.3 The anthropologist Franz Boas, a German-Jewish émigré to the USA, 
who had studied with the ethnologist Adolf Bastian at the University of Berlin, was an 
intimate expert on Völkerpsychologie. In a famous essay on the history of 
anthropology, which served as a manifesto to his approach to cultural anthropology, 
he referred to “Völkerpsychologie” as a major influence for linguistic-anthropological 
studies and specifically mentioned Steinthal’s works.4 As a true synthesis of the 
disciplines that studied “man”, Boasian cultural anthropology practised a 
combination of physical anthropology, ethnology, linguistics and psychology that 
included perspectives of Lazarus and Steinthal’s Völkerpsychologie, but went far 
beyond its scope. His British “counterpart” Bronislaw Malinowski had a similar 
trajectory. Before he established himself in British academia, he had studied with 
Wilhelm Wundt in Leipzig, where he had started working on a PhD in 
                                                   
3  W. I. Thomas, “The Scope and Method of Folk-Psychology”, in American Journal of 
Sociology 1 (1896), 434-45, at 438. See W. I. Thomas, “The Province of Social 
Psychology”, in American Journal of Sociology 10 (1905), 445-55; M. Bulmer, The 
Chicago School of Sociology. Institutionalisation, Diversity, and the Rise of 
Sociological Research (Chicago, 1984), 36. On Lombroso see P. Becker, Verderbnis 
und Entartung. Eine Geschichte der Kriminologie des 19. Jahrhunderts als Diskurs 
und Praxis (Göttingen, 2002), 291-311. 
4  F. Boas, “The History of Anthropology”, in Science 20,512 (1904), 513-24. See G. W. 
Stocking Jr., “Franz Boas and the Culture Concept in Historical Perspective”, in Idem, 
Race, Culture and Evolution (Chicago, 1982), 195-233; G. W. Stocking Jr., ed., 
Volksgeist as Method and Ethic. Essays on Boasian Ethnography and the German 
Anthropological Tradition (Madison, WI, 1996); H. W. Schmuhl, ed., 
Kulturrelativismus und Antirassismus. Der Anthropologe Franz Boas (1858-1942) 
(Bielefeld, 2009). 
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Völkerpsychologie, which he never finished. Best known for his efforts in introducing 
empirical field-work to the study on anthropology, Malinowski agreed with Wundt 
that anthropology essentially constituted a branch of psychology.5 In Russia and the 
early Soviet Union, Lazarus and Steinthal’s Völkerpsychologie received the attention 
of the philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin (1895-1975) who learned about their work 
mediated by the literary critic A.N. Veselovskij and the linguist A.A. Potebnja. In a 
theoretical work on the “problems of types of speech” Bakhtin explicitly referred to 
Lazarus and Steinthal’s Völkerpsychologie as a way of conceptualizing collective 
consciousness.6 Even in Japan, German Völkerpsychologie found its readers and 
followers.7 
It was in France, however, where central elements of Völkerpsychologie had 
the most profound effect on scholars and intellectuals who showed a keen interest in 
the works of Lazarus, Steinthal and Wundt. From a German perspective, the 
popularity and knowledge of Völkerpsychologie in France is striking, given the self-
centred outlook of Lazarus, Steinthal and Wundt, and their general ignorance of 
                                                   
5  M. N. Forster, After Herder: Philosophy of Language in the German Tradition 
(Cambridge, 2010), 204-6. 
6  M. M. Bakhtin, Speech Genres and other late Essays, eds C. Emerson and M. 
Holquist, (Austin, 1986). A. Hoeschen, “Anamnesis als ästhetische Rekonfiguration. 
Zu Bachtins dialogischer Erinnnerungskultur”, in G. Oesterle, ed., Erinnerung, 
Gedächtnis, Wissen. Studien zur kulturwissenschaftlichen Gedächtnisforschung 
(Göttingen, 2001), 246-8; C. Brandist, “The Rise of Soviet Sociolinguistics from the 
Ashes of Völkerpsychologie”, in Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 42 
(2006), 261-77. 
7  Richard Reitan, “Völkerpsychologie and the Appropriation of ‘Spirit’ in Meiji Japan”, 
in Modern Intellectual History 7 (2010), 495-522. 
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French academia. The pioneers of the French social sciences, however, closely 
observed their German counterparts, and in the process appropriated and reworked 
central perspectives and concepts they found in German Völkerpsychologie, which 
were thus included in seminal works of the early social sciences which have acquired 
the status of “classical” texts. Some of the best-known French academics and 
intellectuals of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century – Théodule Ribot, 
Célestin Bouglé, Ernest Renan, Alfred Fouillée, Emile Durkheim, and Marcel Mauss -
– commented extensively on Lazarus, Steinthal and Wundt, and developped their 
versions of a “social science” that would reach beyond traditional philosophy, 
philology and history in a close dialogue with Völkerpsychologie.8 After outlining the 
main tenets of German Völkerpsychologie, I will reconstruct this French reception of 
Völkerpsychologie and argue that it constituted a significant but neglected process of 
cultural transfer between Germany and France. The French reception and 
appropriation of Völkerpsychologie is crucial to an understanding of the deeply 
entangled intellectual relations between the two neighbouring countries around the 
turn of the century. 9 Furthermore, it forces us to rethink the formative period of the 
social sciences: far from being an oddity that can be confined to a German intellectual 
Sonderweg, Völkerpsychologie was an integral part of these wideranging debates. 
                                                   
8  M. Espagne, En-deça du Rhin. L’Allemagne des philosophes français au XIXe siècle 
(Paris, 2004). 
9  M. Espagne and M. Werner, eds, Transferts: les relations interculturelles dans 
l’espace franco-allemand (Paris, 1988); M. Espagne, Les transferts culturels franco-
allemands, (Paris, 1999); J. Paulmann, “Internationaler Vergleich und 
interkultureller Transfer: Zwei Forschungsansätze zur europäischen Geschichte des 
18. bis 20. Jahrhunderts” in Historische Zeitschrift 267 (1998), 649-85. 
  
7 
 
Not least because of its French readers and critics, Völkerpsychologie had a lasting 
impact on the intellectual history of the twentieth century as part of the movement 
that created the social sciences. 
 
II. 
When Moritz Lazarus coined the phrase “Völkerpsychologie” in 1851, attempts to 
characterize the essence of nations or peoples were hardly new.10 Indeed, some 
authors could easily trace the “othering” of foreign nations back to Herodotus and 
Thucydides, a venerable tradition Lazarus and his co-worker Steinthal were well 
aware of. Heavily indebted to the ideas of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), they 
                                                   
10  On Lazarus and Steinthal see I. Belke, ed., Moritz Lazarus und Heymann Steinthal: 
Die Begründer der Völkerpsychologie in ihren Briefen, 3 vols, (Tübingen, 1971-1986); 
M. Bunzl, “Völkerpsychologie and German-Jewish emancipation”, in H. G. Penny and 
M. Bunzl, eds, Worldly Provincialism: German Anthropology in the Age of Empire 
(Ann Arbor, 2003), 47-85; G. v. Graevenitz, “‘Verdichtung’. Das Kulturmodell der 
‘Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft’”, in A. Assmann, ed., 
Positionen der Kulturanthropologie (Frankfurt-on-Main, 1994), 148-171; I. Kalmar, 
“The Volkerpsychologie of Lazarus and Steinthal and the Modern Concept of Culture”, 
in Journal of the History of Ideas 48 (1987), 671-690; C. Köhnke, “Der Kulturbegriff 
von Moritz Lazarus – oder: die wissenschaftliche Aneignung des Alltäglichen”, in A. 
Höschen and L. Schneider, eds, Herbarts Kultursystem. Perspektiven der 
Transdisziplinarität im 19. Jahrhundert (Würzburg, 2001), 39-67; C. Köhnke, 
‘Einleitung’, in M. Lazarus, Grundzüge der Völkerpsychologie und 
Kulturwissenschaft, ed. by C. Köhnke (Hamburg, 2003), ix-xlii; C. Trautmann-
Waller, Aux origines d’une science allemande de la culture. Linguistique et 
psychologie des peuples chez Heymann Steinthal (Paris, 2006). 
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believed in national progress as much as in the assumption of a harmonic plurality of 
the different nations that constituted mankind. In contrast to earlier attempts to 
conceptualize “national character” from Montesquieu to John Stuart Mill, however, 
their aim was to build a comprehensive discipline that was exclusively devoted to the 
study of the “folk spirit” (Volksgeist). Lazarus and Steinthal’s Völkerpsychologie 
provided an amalgam of the philosophies Joseph Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841), 
Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835) and Georg W. F. Hegel (1770-1831) and aimed at 
an alternative to both historicism and philosophical idealism. Their contributions to 
“Völkerpsychologie” kept much of the romantic terminology of the early nineteenth 
century, most importantly the concept of the Volksgeist, as well as an uncritical belief 
in the Volk as the source of everything that was good, true, and beautiful. For Lazarus 
and Steinthal, the “folk spirit” was not only an important aspect of history, but the 
driving force of any historical development. Hence they declared the discovering of 
the “laws of the development of the folk spirit” the main purpose of 
Völkerpsychologie. It would illuminate the causes for the creation, the development 
and the decline of peoples.11  
                                                   
11  Their main contributions on Völkerpsychologie can be found in M. Lazarus, “Über 
den Begriff und die Möglichkeit einer Völkerpsychologie”, in Deutsches Museum. 
Zeitschrift für Literatur, Kunst und öffentliches Leben, 1 (1851), 112-26; M. Lazarus 
and H. Steinthal, “Einleitende Gedanken über Völkerpsychologie, als Einladung zu ei-
ner Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft”, in Zeitschrift für 
Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft 1 (1860), 1-73; M. Lazarus, “Einige 
synthetische Gedanken zur Völkerpsychologie” in ZfVS 3 (1865), 1-94; H. Steinthal, 
“Begriff der Völkerpsychologie”, in Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und 
Sprachwissenschaft 17 (1887), 223-64. 
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A discipline that focused on the study of man as a social being was overdue, 
they argued, since psychology had thus far remained incomplete and structurally 
flawed by concentrating on the individual mind. Man, however, was “by birth a 
member of a Volk, and is thus determined in his mental development in manifold 
ways”. The “folk”, to which man belonged by nature, represented more than the sum 
of its parts, Lazarus and Steinthal were convinced.12 The individual could not be 
adequately understood “without regard to the mental whole (die geistige Gesamtheit) 
in which it has been created and in which it lives”.13 One of the main tasks of 
Völkerpsychologie, then, was to clarify the interaction (Wechselwirkung) between 
the individual and the community. Lazarus and Steinthal understood this relation as 
an asymmetric one, since the “mental activity” of an individual was always rooted in 
the “spirit” of the folk. The community regularly took precedence over the individual. 
Individual achievements could only be understood and explained as products of the 
folk spirit, even though they were “expressed” by individuals. Language was the 
prime example to illustrate this point: it was never “invented” or “created” by an 
individual, but as a means of communication presupposed the existence of a folk 
community. For civilized nations (Kulturvölker), language was the most natural 
medium to express their peculiarities; it was passed on from generation to generation 
and perfected in the process. Equally customs, works of art, and the general culture of 
a folk were products of a “slow and incremental progressive development”, but not 
                                                   
12  Lazarus and Steinthal, “Einleitende Gedanken”, 27-8. 
13  H. Steinthal, Grammatik, Logik, und Psychologie, ihre Prinzipien und ihr Verhältnis 
zueinander (Berlin, 1855), 388. 
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creations of an individual.14 Each Volk thus developed its own “objective spirit” which 
existed independently of the individual “subjective spirit”. This “folk spirit” turned 
the multitude of individuals into a coherent people since it functioned as the “bond, 
the principle, and the idea of a people” through which a nation acquired its unity and 
became a harmonic, organic entity.15 Lazarus and Steinthal thus presented the 
separation of humanity into Völker or nations as the natural form of existence. To 
them, differences between “peoples” were not primarily a cause for conflicts, but 
rather the precondition for the “development of mankind”. The diversity and 
pluralism of nations, Lazarus and Steinthal argued, needed to be welcomed and 
encouraged since it allowed for the advancement of humanity and culture. The 
approach of Völkerpsychologie itself, they believed, would show how the “diversity of 
peoples” contributed to the “development of the human spirit”.16 
Lazarus and Steinthal’s Völkerpsychologie epitomized the mentality of 
nineteenth century liberals with its belief in science, progress, and the nation; these 
convictions were re-enforced by their experience of Jewish emancipation. While their 
support of the national movement in Germany represented the conventional wisdom 
of middle-class intellectuals, they introduced a notion of the “folk” that showed an 
exceptional level of reflection and analysis. Even though they considered language as 
                                                   
14  Lazarus, Steinthal, “Einleitende Gedanken”, 31; M. Lazarus, “Verdichtung des 
Denkens in der Geschichte”, in ZfVS 2 (1862), 54-62, at 57; M. Lazarus, “Über das 
Verhältnis des Einzelnen zur Geamtheit”, in ZfVS 2 (1862), 393-453; see B. Weiler, 
Die Ordnung des Fortschritts: Zum Aufstieg und Fall der Fortschrittsidee der 
‘jungen’ Anthropologie (Bielefeld, 2006), 183-90. 
15  Lazarus, Steinthal, “Einleitende Gedanken”, 28-9. 
16  Lazarus, Steinthal, “Einleitende Gedanken”, 5-6. 
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the most important common trait of a Volk, they found it insufficient to define it by 
language alone, since some languages were used by more than one nation (notably 
German and English), while other nations, such as Switzerland, used more than one 
language. Common descent or kinship could not define a nation either, Lazarus and 
Steinthal argued, since all nations were ethnically mixed. A neat “objective” definition 
of the nation or the “folk” was hard to come by. As a consequence, they introduced a 
subjective or voluntaristic notion of the Volk: Its existence and reality depended on 
the will of its members to become a folk and belong to it. The “folk” or nation was the 
result of a conscious and deliberate decision of its members; it depended on the 
realization of its members of their common “folk spirit”. The Volk was the “first 
product of the folk spirit”. Therefore, its “character” was flexible and changeable, and 
it needed to be re-created permanently.17 
Wilhelm Wundt, best known as the “founding father” of modern, scientific 
psychology, was also the scholar most closely associated with the concept of 
Völkerpsychologie. He devoted the last twenty years of his long career to writing a 
general and comprehensive Völkerpsychologie, which was published in ten massive 
volumes from 1900 – a task that Lazarus and Steinthal had not even attempted.18 
                                                   
17  Ibid., 32-36. 
18  On Wundt’s Völkerpsychologie, see C. M. Schneider, Wilhelm Wundts 
Völkerpsychologie. Entstehung und Entwicklung eines in Vergessenheit geratenen, 
wissenschaftshistorisch relevanten Fachgebietes (Bonn, 1990); G. Eckardt, 
“Einleitung in die historischen Texte’” in Idem, ed., Völkerpsychologie: Versuch einer 
Neuentdeckung (Weinheim, 1997), 78-112. A full academic biography of Wundt 
remains a desideratum, see S. Diamond, ‘Wundt before Leipzig’ in R.W. Rieber, ed., 
Wilhelm Wundt and the Making of a Scientific Psychology (New York and London, 
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Wundt considered the Völkerpsychologie his finest achievement; it formed an 
integral part of his concept of psychology, which consisted of two separate, but 
complementary branches. According to Wundt, all psychological knowledge was 
based on individual psychology, or physiological psychology, which dealt with simple 
processes of the mind. These could be studied with experimental methods, which he 
had “borrowed” from physiology and introduced to psychological research. This 
“scientific” approach to psychology, practised in psychological “laboratories”, 
established his fame and reputation and secured him his place in the annals of the 
discipline.19 Experimental methods were, however, only of limited use for 
psychologists, Wundt argued, since they could only be applied to the study of the 
most basic functions of the mind such as reactions, perceptions, and sensations. The 
more complex, higher “products” of the mind asked for a different approach since 
they could not be recreated in the set-up of a laboratory, but only observed indirectly: 
“The same Wundt whose laboratory functioned as the inspiration and model for 
numerous imitators was also the source for a mounting stream of restrictions on the 
use of the experimental method in psychology.”20 Complex and “composite” 
                                                                                                                                                               
1980), 3-70; W. G. Bringmann, W. D. G. Balance and R. B. Evans, “Wilhelm Wundt 
1832-1920: A Brief Biographical Sketch”, in Journal of the History of the Behavioral 
Sciences 11 (1975), 287-97; G. Lamberti, Wilhelm Maximilian Wundt (1832-1920): 
Leben, Werk und Persönlichkeit in Bildern und Texten (Bonn, 1995). 
19  See W. Wundt, Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie (Leipzig, 1873). This 
introductory text was Wundt’s most successful and influential work; it was translated 
into several languages and remained in print long after his death.  
20  K. Danziger, Constructing the Subject: Historical Origins of Psychological Research 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1990), 36. See M. G. Ash, “Academic Politics in the History of 
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psychological phenomena were not creations of the individual, but of the folk, Wundt 
agreed with Lazarus and Steinthal. Völkerpsychologie, then, formed the necessary 
extension of individual psychology in order to arrive at a general psychology that fully 
explained the development of human life. For Wundt, individual psychology and 
Völkerpsychologie were the two sides of the same coin: clearly distinguished in scope 
and method, they formed integral parts of psychology as a whole.21  
A major inspiration for Wundt’s Völkerpsychologie had been Lazarus and 
Steinthal’s Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft. He adopted 
the very term Völkerpsychologie and stuck to it despite serious criticism. He also 
accepted the suggestion that Völkerpsychologie should primarily study language, 
myths and customs. Wundt’s concept of Völkerpsychologie, then, owed more to the 
efforts of Lazarus and Steinthal than he was ready to admit. He evaluated their 
programmatic articles critically and stressed the differences between their 
approaches; at closer inspection, however, the similarities between the two versions 
of Völkerpsychologie outweigh the differences by far.22 Similar to Lazarus and 
Steinthal, Wundt’s interest in Völkerpsychologie was related to his interest in ethics, 
                                                                                                                                                               
Science: Experimental Psychology in Germany 1871-1941”, in Central European 
History 13 (1980), 255-86.  
21  See W. Wundt, Erlebtes und Erkanntes (Leipzig, 1920), 218: “Beide, 
Individualpsychologie und Psychologie der Gemeinschaft, gehören zusammen, und 
das Denken in seiner die komplexen Vorgänge des Seelenlebens umfassenden 
Bedeutung läßt sich ebensowenig aus den Eigenschaften des individuellen 
Bewußtseins allein ableiten, wie sich etwa der Staat als eine rein individuelle 
Erfindung begreifen läßt.” 
22  G. Eckardt, Völkerpsychologie; Schneider, Wilhelm Wundts Völkerpsychologie. 
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the traditional moral philosophy.23 He agreed that any study of ethics had to build on 
“folk-psychological” knowledge and described Völkerpsychologie as the “portico” 
(Vorhalle) of ethics.24 The clearest and most concise summary of Wundt’s concept of 
Völkerpsychologie can be found in the introduction to his single volume Elements of 
Folk Psychology, published in 1912.25 In contrast to the multi-volume long version of 
Völkerpsychologie which analysed the appearances of the “folk soul”, i.e. language, 
myth and religion, and customs separately, the one-volume digest provided a 
chronologically organized history of mankind (or civilization). Wundt argued that 
such a comprehensive summary was the real aim of his Völkerpsychologie, thus 
                                                   
23  M. Lazarus, Die Ethik des Judenthums, vol. 1 (Frankfurt-on-Main, 1898); H. 
Steinthal, Allgemeine Ethik (Berlin, 1885). D. Baumgardt, ‘The Ethics of Lazarus and 
Steinthal’, in Yearbook of the Leo Baeck Institute 2 (1957), 205-17. 
24  W. Wundt, Ethik. Eine Untersuchung der Tatsachen und Gesetze des sittlichen 
Lebens (Stuttgart, 1886), p. iii: ‘Als die Vorhalle zur Ethik betrachte ich die 
Völkerpsychologie, der neben anderen Aufgaben insbesondere auch die zukommt, die 
Geschichte der Sitte und der sittlichen Vorstellungen unter psychologischen 
Gersichtspunkten zu behandeln.’ This study was reprinted and enlarged several times 
during Wundt’s lifetime.  
25  W. Wundt, Elemente der Völkerpsychologie. Grundlinien einer psychologischen 
Entwicklungsgeschichte der Menschheit (Leipzig, 1912), 1-11. This volume was the 
only one to be translated into English as Elements of folk psychology, London, 1916; 
most British and American commentators’ knowledge of Wundt’s Völkerpsychologie 
was restricted to this volume. See T. S. Eliot, “Review of Wundt, Elements of Folk 
Psychology”, in International Journal of Ethics 27 (1917), 252-254; G. H. Mead, “A 
Translation of Wundt’s ‘Folk Psychology’”, in The American Journal of Theology 23 
(1919), 533-536. 
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stressing its teleological character. “Development” was the main organizing principle 
of his approach, and Wundt put forward a number of bold theses about the “origins” 
of social practices and institutions. Similar to the development of the individual from 
childhood to adolescence to adulthood, peoples developed in clearly defined stages, 
he argued. The first stage in this Völkerentwicklung was the primitive age, which 
formed the “lowest level of culture”.26 The primitive age was followed by the 
totemistic age, defined as a state of mind where, in contrast to modern times, the 
“animal ruled over the human being”. The next step in the development of mankind 
was the age of “heroes and gods”; it was defined by the emergence and rule of 
individuals and the military (kriegerische) organization of the “tribal community”, 
which in turn led to the emergence of the state. The “age of heroes and gods” also 
witnessed the emergence of national religions; epic tales replaced the myths and fairy 
tales of earlier times. The fourth stage of the development of mankind was 
characterized by the predominance of the national state and national religions, which 
still dominated the present time. The future development of civilization, however, 
would overcome national divisions and lead to “humanity”, a truly universal world-
civilization. 
 
III. 
The outline of a comprehensive Völkerpsychologie as suggested by Lazarus, Steinthal 
and Wundt included serious conceptual flaws and errors, and contemporary critics 
did not hesitate to expose these.27 But even the reaction of outspoken critics and 
                                                   
26  Wundt, Elemente, pp. 7-8. 
27  See [A.] Lasson, “Review of ‘Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und 
Sprachwissenschaft’”, in Archiv für das Studium der Neueren Sprachen und 
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opponents of Völkerpsychologie shows, by default, that it was not considered an odd, 
somewhat outlandish idea of outsiders to the academic community. Rather, it 
constituted a serious academic approach that had to be reckoned with. Outright 
critics of Völkerpsychologie did not ignore their manifestos and studies, but took the 
time and effort to study them closely in order to expose the problems and fault lines 
related to a new “discipline”.28 The international reception of Völkerpsychologie, 
                                                                                                                                                               
Literaturen 27 (1860), 209-16, who poked fun at Lazarus and Steinthal’s 
programmatic article that opened the first issue of their journal and dismissed 
Völkerpsychologie as a misnomer, as did many other critics. On Lasson see U. Jensen, 
Gebildete Doppelgänger. Bürgerliche Juden und Protestanten im 19. Jahrhundert 
(Göttingen, 2005), 292-4, 300-4. For further critical reviews of Lazarus and 
Steinthal’s Völkerpsychologie see E. von Hartmann, “Das Wesen des Gesammtgeistes. 
(Eine kritische Betrachtung des Grundbegriffes der Völkerpsychologie) [1869]” in 
idem, Gesammelte Studien und Aufsätze gemeinverständlichen Inhalts (Berlin, 
1876), 504-19; P. Barth, Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie. Erster Teil: 
Einleitung und kritische Übersicht (Leipzig, 1897), 276-78; L. Tobler, “Zeitschrift for 
Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft”, in Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie und 
Pädagogik 83 (1861), 257-80. 
28  One of harshest critics of Lazarus and Steinthal was the linguist Hermann Paul (1846-
1921), a one-time student of Steinthal and follower of Herbart’s psychology. The 
introduction to his influential textbook on Principles of the history of language 
included a damning critique of their Völkerpsychologie. See H. Paul, Prinzipien der 
Sprachgeschichte, fourth edition, (Halle-on-the-Saale, 1909), 8-15. While critical of 
parts of Lazarus and Steinthal’s programme, Wilhelm Wundt defended the concept of 
Völkerpsychologie against Paul’s attack: W. Wundt, “Ziele und Wege der 
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from the USA to Russia and Japan, provides further proof of its impact and 
importance. The most avid readers of Völkerpsychologie outside Germany, however, 
were to be found in France, where its reception left the most profound traces in the 
intellectual landscape. Lazarus and Steinthal showed no particular interest in French 
philosophy: Steinthal, who had lived in Paris for four years in the 1850s and had 
gained insight into the intellectual and academic world of the French capital, could 
never shake off his typically German prejudices against French philosophy and 
culture, which he considered shallow and formalistic. In particular, he dismissed 
Auguste Comte’s works as superficial and long-winded, and complained about the 
fundamental “lack of psychology” in his writings.29 French scholars were much more 
open-minded and read Lazarus and Steinthal’s Völkerpsychologie with interest and 
sympathy. One of their earliest French readers was the philosopher and psychologist 
Théodule Ribot (1839-1916), a crucial, but somewhat forgotten personality of French 
academia during the fin-de-siécle. Together with Hippolyte Taine (1828-1893), Ribot 
was one of the main opponents of traditional philosophical “spiritualism”. Inspired 
by both English and German psychology, Ribot was a champion of experimental 
psychology and instrumental in introducing “scientific” methods to French 
philosophy. He admired and translated the works of Herbert Spencer, wrote a major 
study on “psychological heredity” inspired by Charles Darwin and Francis Galton, but 
was best known for his studies on amnesia and the “diseases of memory”.30 A student 
                                                                                                                                                               
Völkerpsychologie”, in Idem, Probleme der Völkerpsychologie, (Leipzig, 1911 [1886]), 
1-35 
29  Steinthal to Lazarus, 12. September 1852, in Belke, ed., vol. 1, 266.  
30  Th. Ribot, L’hérédité, étude psychologique: sur ses phénomènes, ses lois, ses causes, 
ses conséquences (Paris, 1873), Th. Ribot, Les maladies de la mémoire (Paris, 1881). 
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and friend of Jean-Martin Charcot, he founded the first psychological laboratory in 
Paris after the model of Wilhelm Wundt at the University of Leipzig. Similar to 
Wundt, with whom he was in correspondence since the 1870s, he favoured a 
comprehensive psychology that would integrate scientific methods and concepts, but 
would not be restricted to it. In 1876 he founded the Revue Philosophique which he 
edited until his death in 1916; from 1885 to 1888 he taught at the Sorbonne, and then 
held the first chair in psychology at the Collège de France until 1901, which was 
created for Ribot due to the efforts of Ernest Renan.31  
Ribot’s monograph on “Contemporary German Psychology”, published first in 
1879, mainly served to introduce the new experimental psychology of Gustav Theodor 
Fechner (1801-1887), Hermann Lotze (1817-1881) and Wundt to an French audience. 
It also included a chapter on the “Herbart-school” in which he commended the plans 
for a Völkerpsychologie as outlined by Lazarus and Steinthal.32 As the main 
representatives of this “Herbart-school” in Germany he presented the anthropologist 
                                                                                                                                                               
On the reception of Darwin France see Y. Conry, L’introduction du darwinisme en 
France au XIXe siècle (Paris, 1974). 
31  S. Nicolas and D. J. Murray, “Théodule Ribot, 1839-1916, Founder of French 
Psychology: A Biographical Introduction”, in History of Psychology 2 (1999), 277-
301; S. Nicolas, Théodule Ribot (1839-1916): philosophe breton, fondateur de la 
psychologie française (Paris, 2005); R. A. Nye, The Origins of Crowd Psychology: 
Gustave Le Bon and the Crisis of Mass Democracy in the Third Republic (London 
and Beverly Hills, 1975), 13. 
32  Th. Ribot, La Psychologie allemande contemporaine (Ecole expérimentale) (Paris, 
1879), 49-57. To an English audience, Ribot presented Taine as the “chief 
representative in France of what the Germans call Völkerpsychologie”: Th. Ribot, 
“Philosophy in France”, in Mind 2,7 (1877), 366-386, at 376. 
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Theodor Waitz, and Lazarus and Steinthal, thus ignoring Austria and the Habsburg 
empire where Herbartianism played a much more important role than in Imperial 
Germany.33 Waitz, Ribot commented, had amassed facts without arriving at a clear 
concept of a psychology of races (psychologie des races). In contrast, Lazarus and 
Steinthal were the “real founders” of “ethnic psychology”. Ribot was not much 
impressed with their individual scholarly contributions: Steinthal’s linguistic works 
were based on the assumption of an Allgeist or general spirit that functioned as the 
“precondition and bond of every society and as the foundation of moral life”. This 
notion showed Steinthal’s “metaphysical tendencies”, Ribot opined.34 Lazarus’s main 
academic work, his collected essays on the “Life of the Soul”, were more the work of a 
“moraliste” than of a psychologist, according to Ribot. It contained fine observations 
on “humor” as a psychological phenomenon, and on “tact”, “honour” and “glory”. But 
Lazarus resembled more the poets and romanciers on which he had relied for his 
studies than a serious scholar since he did not possess the “rigorous scientific 
method” that was necessary to classify facts and establish “scientific laws”.35 
Still, Lazarus and Steinthal’s “project” for a future Völkerpsychologie, as laid 
down in the programmatic articles published in the Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie 
                                                   
33  A. Hoeschen and L. Schneider, “Herbartianismus im 19. Jahrhundert: Umriß einer 
intellektuellen Konfiguration”, in L. Raphael, ed. Ideen als gesellschaftliche 
Gestaltungskraft im Europa der Neuzeit: Beiträge für eine erneuerte 
Geistesgeschichte (München, 2006), 447-477; A. Hoeschen, and L. Schneider, eds, 
Herbarts Kultursystem: Perspektiven der Transdisziplinarität im 19. Jahrhundert 
(Würzburg, 2001). 
34  Ribot, La psychologie allemande contemporaine, 49. 
35  Ribot, La psychologie allemande contemporaine, 50. 
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und Sprachwissenschaft, found Ribot’s support. He fully agreed with their view that 
the “people” represented more than the sum of its parts, and that a specialized 
psychological discipline was necessary to complement individual psychology: “Next 
to general psychology which studies the individual, there is space for another 
discipline devoted to the study of man as a social being, or more precisely, the many 
groups human beings belong to: this discipline is ethnological psychology.”36 To 
make the case for such a discipline, it was necessary to show that individual 
psychology was an insufficient approach. Adopting the core idea of “mass 
psychology”, Ribot argued that this task could easily be achieved: as soon as people 
became part of a crowd or large group, they changed their behaviour and developed 
habits that the individual did not possess. It did not matter where this change in 
behaviour came from, since it could be observed and thus established as fact. History 
showed clearly to what degree the character of a people could differ from that of the 
individuals it was made up of.37 Irrespective of how this difference could be 
explained, since it existed as a fact, it provided Völkerpsychologie (psychologie des 
peuples) with an object of study. 
Ribot accepted Lazarus and Steinthal’s concept of the Volksgeist, “cet esprit 
d’un peuple”, even though he criticized their definition of the “objective spirit” of a 
people as a “bit mystical” (un peu mystique). The example of language as the primary 
element of the Volksgeist convinced him, though. Ribot assumed that the Volksgeist 
                                                   
36  Ribot, La psychologie allemande contemporaine, 51: “A coté de la psychologie 
ordinaire, qui a pour objet l’homme individuel, il y a place pour une autre science 
consacrée à l’homme social ou plus exactement aux divers groupes humains: c’est la 
psychologie ethnologique.” 
37  Ribot, La psychologie allemande contemporaine, 52. 
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represented the average of a nation; one had to ignore children, “idiots” and 
“retarded people” as well as outstanding geniuses to study the “objective spirit”, as 
represented by the remaining average.38 Lazarus and Steinthal had clearly defined 
the elements which constituted the Volksgeist and would form the object of study of 
the new discipline: Next to language they listed myths, religion, customs, poetry, 
writing, art, but also practical life, mores, professions, family life, and the many 
reciprocal relations between these manifestations of the objective spirit. They had 
thus outlined a proper “scientific” history which could follow the model of the natural 
sciences and promised to elevate the study of history to the rank of a proper scientific 
discipline: “The laws of biography, i.e. the development of individual spirits, have to 
be established by the psychology of the individual; in the same way, the laws of 
history, which could be called the biography of nations, have to be established by 
comparative psychology which will thus constitute a truly scientific history.”39 Still, 
Ribot was well aware of the shortcomings of Lazarus and Steinthal’s grandiose plans. 
Despite outlining a neat programme of study, and despite the twenty years of its 
existence, their journal had not fulfilled its promises. It had provided a number of 
useful materials and documents, but no precise results and no general conclusions. 
Most of the contributions were of a literary, not scientific character. Most 
importantly, Lazarus and Steinthal had not provided a clear methodology for their 
                                                   
38  Ribot, La psychologie allemande contemporaine, 53. 
39  Ribot, La psychologie allemande contemporaine, 54: “Les lois de la biographie, c’est-
à-dire du développement des esprits individuels, doivent se résoudre dans la 
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new discipline; therefore, except for collecting interesting material, they had not yet 
achieved anything, in contrast to British anthropologists such as Edward Tylor (1832-
1917), John Lubbock (1834-1913) and John McLennan (1827-1881), whose research 
had been ignored by the German folk psychologists.40 
Ernest Renan (1823-1892) did not stop at commenting on Lazarus and 
Steinthal’s Völkerpsychologie, but adopted a cornerstone of it, namely their 
voluntaristic and subjective definition of the nation. He incorporated this notion in 
his famous lecture on the definition of the nation, albeit for different reasons and in a 
different context. To the dismay of Lazarus, Renan did not reveal his source of 
inspiration.41 In his autobiography, Lazarus claimed that Renan had copied the 
central points of his famous lecture Qu’est-ce qu'une nation?, delivered in 1882 at the 
Sorbonne and which soon became a work of reference for scholars of nationalism, 
directly from his speech Was heißt national? This text was Lazarus’s contribution to 
the debate about antisemitism that had been sparked by the historian Heinrich von 
Treitschke (1834-1896). In order to defend the German Jews against anti-Semitic 
accusations, Lazarus had employed ideas from Völkerpsychologie.42 One of Lazarus’s 
                                                   
40  Ribot, La psychologie allemande contemporaine, 57. 
41  Belke, ‘Einleitung’, vol. 1, 95-6; Jensen, Gebildete Doppelgänger, pp. 86-7.  
42  E. Renan, Qu’est-ce qu’une nation? Conférence faite en Sorbonne, le 11 mars 1882 
(Paris, 1882); M. Lazarus, “Was heißt national?”, in Idem, Treu und Frei. Gesammelte 
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students, the teacher Alfred Leicht who was in charge of editing his autobiographical 
writings and tried to preserve the image of his teacher for posterity, even accused 
Renan of plagiarism because he had not referenced Lazarus’s text.43 It is certainly 
possible that Renan, a scholar who was very familiar with German philosophy, arts 
and letters, found much inspiration in Lazarus’s text. Steinthal had known Renan 
personally since his time in Paris, and had published a very critical review of his work 
on the “character of the semitic peoples” in the first volume of the ZfVS. Lazarus had 
met Renan occasionally, too.44 Despite this dispute, the similarities between both 
texts are striking: similar to Lazarus, Renan dismissed attempts to define a nation by 
“objective” criteria such as language, territory and race as insufficient. All these 
“objective” factors played a part in the formation of nations and had to be considered 
by historians and philosophers, Renan argued, but they could not alone explain the 
characteristics of a nation. Renan argued that the “national spirit” depended as much 
on common memory as on forgetting, an idea that recalls Nietzsche’s “monumental 
history”. To create a strong and powerful national spirit, Renan claimed, it was not 
only necessary to accumulate knowledge, but also to cast aside the memory national 
defeats. Importantly, Renan argued that the existence of a nation could not be taken 
for granted. Rather, it had to be re-enacted perpetually, a mechanism for which he 
coined the catch-phrase of the nation as a “daily plebiscite”. In complete agreement 
with Lazarus, Renan argued that the nation ultimately rested on the will of its 
                                                   
43  A. Leicht, Lazarus, Begründer der Völkerpsychologie (Leipzig, 1911), 19. Leicht’s 
outrage was exaggerated since Renan’s text did not include any references. 
44  See H. Steinthal, ‘Zur Charakteristik der semitischen Völker’ ZfVS 1 (1860), 328-45; 
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members to form a nation; it was “socially constructed”. Furthermore, both Lazarus’s 
and Renan’s texts were directed at the same opponents, i.e. German-Prussian 
nationalists such as von Treitschke whose aim was “complete” the political 
unification of Germany and therfore targeted the alleged “enemies” of the German 
nation: Catholics, Socialists, and Jews. Lazarus, however, had employed the idea of 
the nation as a product of the will of its members to defend the rights of the German 
Jews as full members of the German nation. Renan, in contrast, used the same idea to 
argue against the claims of German nationalists to the annexed regions of Alsace and 
Lorraine as “naturally” German provinces.45 
Within the emerging “Durkheim school” of sociology, German 
Völkerpsychologie was widely acknowledged and discussed in detail. The sociologist 
Celestin Bouglé (1870-1940), a close collaborator of Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) and 
from 1908 professor at the Sorbonne, evaluated Lazarus’s Völkerpsychologie even 
more positively than Ribot before him. Like many of his contemporaries, Bouglé had 
been a visiting student at the University of Berlin in the 1880s where he had been 
introduced to the concept of Völkerpsychologie by Lazarus.46 Upon his return, he 
produced a study that introduced a French audience to “the contemporary social 
sciences” in Germany. Bouglé presented Lazarus to French readers as the founder of 
“social psychology” in Germany and introduced him alongside Georg Simmel (1858-
1918), the economist Adolph Wagner (1835-1917) and the philosopher of law Rudolf 
von Jhering (1818-1892), thus slightly overestimating the standing and influence of 
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his former teacher at the University of Berlin.47 Bouglé summarized the main tenets 
of Lazarus and Steinthal’s approach accurately and without any criticism. The 
remaining problems and conceptual weaknesses of “social psychology” were 
irrelevant, Bouglé argued, considering the advantages over traditional “individualist” 
philosophy that the new approach offered. Lazarus had shown the way not only for 
psychologists, but for all social scientists eager to overcome the deficits of traditional 
philosophy that had all but ignored group phenomena and communal life.48 Emile 
Durkheim (1858-1917) was equally familiar with Lazarus and Steinthal’s 
Völkerpsychologie, but was more reserved in his comments than his colleague 
Bouglé. Agreeing with Ribot, he complained about the lack of positive results of 
Völkerpsychologie. So far, it was little more than a fashionable term for general 
linguistics and comparative philology.49 The philosopher Henri Berr (1863-1954), the 
founder of the Revue de Synthèse, incorporated Lazarus’s concept of Verdichtung in 
history in his early study on “The Future of Philosophy”: “The mind is the product of 
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48  Bouglé, Les Sciences sociales, 38, 42. See W. P. Vogt, “Un durkheimien ambivalent: 
Célestin Bouglé 1870-1940”, in Revue Française de Sociologie 20 (1979), 123-39. 
49  E. Durkheim, “Cours de science sociale: leçon d’ouverture [1888]”, in Idem, La 
Science Social et l’Action, Paris, 1970, as quoted in E. Apfelbaum, “Origines de la 
psychologie sociale en France: développements souterraines et discipline méconnue”, 
in Revue Française de Sociologie 22 (1981), 397-407, at 402: “Si nous n’avons rien dit 
tout a l'heure des intéressants travaux de Lazarus et Steinthal, c’est que jusqu’ici ils 
n’ont pas donné de resultats. La Völkerpsychologie, telle qu’ils l’entendaient, n'est 
guère qu’un mot nouveau pour désigner la linguistique générale et la philologie 
comparée.” 
  
26 
 
history; history is thinking in epitome.”50 In his major work on the “Historical 
Synthesis” he was more reserved towards Lazarus and Steinthal. Echoing Ribot’s 
judgement, Berr praised the “intriguing intuitions” on which Völkerpsychologie 
rested, but complained that it consisted of disparate elements that could not be 
reconciled in a genuine synthesis. Equally, he considered Wundt’s approach 
legitimate, but asked for a more “positive” method.51  
While Ribot and Bouglé acknowledged and commented favourably on Lazarus 
and Steinthal’s Völkerpsychologie, but did not attempt to contribute to this new 
“discipline” on their own, the social philosopher Alfred Fouillée (1838-1912) became 
the most famous representative of a genuine French psychologie des peuples around 
the turn of the century. Originally a specialist on Greek philosophy, he turned to the 
philosophy of history and the study of contemporary society, and introduced a theory 
of idées forces as the motor of historical development and the “glue” of society.52 In 
1898, he published a Psychology of the French People which made ample use of 
Lazarus and Steinthal’s Völkerpsychologie. Most importantly, he adopted Lazarus’s 
definition of the folk spirit, l’esprit national, arguably the most original idea of his 
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Völkerpsychologie. According to Fouillée, the national spirit was not only an effect, 
but also a cause, and it was not only defined by individuals, but defined them as 
well.53 Like Ribot before him, Fouillée also referred to the results of mass psychology 
as an aid for Völkerpsychologie. Gabriel Tarde (1843-1904), Scipio Sighele (1868-
1913), and Gustave Le Bon (1841-1931), had shown, he argued, that as part of a group, 
the individual changed his character; hence large groups, and certainly nations, could 
not simply be treated as an addition of individuals. Every nation, Fouillée 
maintained, had its own unique consciousness and its own will, but the reigning 
individualism in the study of politics, economics, psychology and ethics had obscured 
this simple fact. Just like every individual was characterized by a set of idées-forces, 
every nation had a similar set of guiding ideas.54 
Fouillée’s main target, however, were not the “individualists” who had ignored 
the importance of society and the nation, but the craniologists and phrenologists who 
tried to explain the differences between nations by studying the average form of 
skulls or the weight of brains. He referred to the jurist and sociologist Ludwig 
Gumplowicz (1838-1909) and Gustave Le Bon as representatives of such an 
approach; his main opponent, however, was the count Georges Vacher de Lapouge 
(1854-1936), an outspoken racial antisemite and follower of the “Aryan myth”.55 To 
counter the ideas of scientific racism, which had become increasingly popular by the 
end of the nineteenth century, Fouillée employed a paraphrase of Lazarus’s definition 
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of the nation. A nation could never be defined exclusively by physiological, 
ethnographic, or economic factors. Rather, “national individuality” manifested itself 
through psychological forces, namely language, religion, literature and art, buildings, 
and the image a nation held of itself and of others. Therefore, Fouillée pleaded for a 
middling position between “idealists” and “materialists”: He conceded that biological 
factors played a part in constituting a nation, but could never exhaustively explain its 
peculiarities. As the three “major causes” that formed a nation, he identified its 
“constitution”, “temperament” and “mental character”.56 In contrast to Lazarus and 
Steinthal, then, Fouillée put more emphasis on biological factors in defining a nation, 
but he ultimately and emphatically agreed with their “voluntaristic” definition of the 
folk spirit.57 The “essence” of a nation was to be found in its “conscience”, not in 
physical traits. Despite Fouillée’s effort in outlining a balanced approach to 
Völkerpsychologie that would meet academic standards, he invited similar criticisms 
as Lazarus and Steinthal: his book on the mind of the French people as well as a 
further study, which compared the characters of the major European nations, merely 
listed common stereotypes and clichés, dressed up as social science. Fouillée had not 
discovered the method that would have allowed for the scientific study of the ‘mind of 
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the nation’, hence his writings did not go beyond the speculations of journalists and 
travel writers.58 
Wilhelm Wundt had started publishing his Völkerpsychologie at a time when 
the social sciences, and particularly sociology, were slowly emerging as distinct 
disciplines, after decades of latency. He had clearly distinguished Völkerpsychologie 
from sociology, and one of the reasons he stubbornly stuck to the much debated term 
Völkerpsychologie over “social psychology” or “sociology” was the “presentist” 
outlook of the latter. The champions of sociology, in turn, could not ignore Wundt’s 
Völkerpsychologie since it too obviously overlapped with their own efforts to study 
“society” as a whole. Many sympathetic critics of Wundt argued that he had really 
created a “social” psychology, and Völkerpsychologie found itself in competition with 
sociology to establish a true social science, positioned in between the natural sciences 
and the humanities. Emile Durkheim, the French “founding father” of sociology, 
owed much to Wundt in his efforts to establish the “new sociology” in France. Having 
spent the academic year 1885-86 in Berlin and Leipzig in an effort to make himself 
familiar with the German “moral sciences”, he gained a first-hand experience of 
Wundt’s psychology, and subsequently wrote two reports for the French Ministry of 
Education on the state of the “positive sciences” and on “moral philosophy” in 
Germany.59 A former student of Théodule Ribot – who in turn admired Wundt’s 
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experimental psychology60 –Durkheim was particularly impressed by Wundt’s anti-
metaphysical approach to moral philosophy. His report on the “moral sciences” was 
in fact an extended review of Wundt’s Ethics, which he compared to the works of the 
“socialists of the chair” (Kathedersozialisten), namely Adolph Wagner and Gustav 
Schmoller (1838-1917), as well as Albert Schäffle (1831-1903) and the philosopher of 
law Rudolf Jhering. As Durkheim explained, in contrast to the “Manchester”-school 
of political economy all these scholars agreed that “society” was not simply a 
collection of individuals, but constituted an object of its own. Secondly, they had 
demonstrated that morality as well as the law were not intellectual abstractions, but 
empirical facts that had to be studied as such.61 Durkheim confirmed that Wundt’s 
method was “purely empirical” (nettement empirique). He strongly agreed with him 
that “collective phenomena” such as morality and religion had to be studied 
empirically, and that social psychology (as Durkheim’s translation of 
Völkerpsychologie) would provide the relevant material to do so. It was a common 
mistake to view the individual as the “principal motor” of social life whereas 
“collective facts” such as ethics and religion originated in other social facts.62 
According to Durkheim, Wundt’s study was outstanding for mainly two reasons: first, 
it was rigorously based on facts and avoided abstract or normativist speculations, and 
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second, it showed that morality had “evolved” according to laws that science was to 
determine.63 
In his later career, Durkheim played down the inspiration he received from 
Wundt, and German scholarship in general, mainly because he was keen to be seen as 
a truly original scholar, but also because he was accused of having lifted the main 
elements of his sociology from German authors. In 1907, the Belgian Catholic writer 
Simon Deploige attacked Durkheim directly and argued that his sociology was not 
French in origin, as Durkheim had proudly claimed, but nothing but a paraphrase of 
German ideas. All of Durkheim’s “main ideas were basically German in origin”, 
Deploige stated, and therefore alien to French thinking.64 His denunciation was part 
of a general polemic against Durkheim’s school and the Nouvelle Sorbonne which 
constituted, in Wolf Lepenies’s words, a “rear battle of the Dreyfus affair”. The 
defamation of Durkheim’s sociology as “German” and foreign thus included a barely 
disguised anti-Semitic accusation.65 To his defence, while conceding that he had 
learned much from German philosophy and social science, Durkheim insisted on the 
originality and “Frenchness” of his approach, and played down German influences on 
his sociology. Still, and despite his reputation as a harsh and ruthless reviewer, 
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throughout his career treated Wundt’s works with respect and referred to them in all 
his major studies.66  
In 1913, Durkheim published a long review of Wundt’s Elemente der 
Völkerpsychologie in his own journal, L’année sociologique. This article showed him 
much more sceptical towards Wundt than in his earlier comments on the Ethics.67 
The fact that Wundt insisted on the name Völkerpsychologie instead of “social 
psychology” did not convince Durkheim. Wundt’s dismissal of sociology as a limited 
and “presentist” approach revealed an odd understanding the discipline; thus far, 
Durkheim explained, his own contributions to sociology had been criticized not for an 
exaggerated concern with the present, but for their focus on ancient and primitive 
forms of civilization.68 Moreover, Durkheim was not convinced by Wundt’s method of 
studying contemporary primitive civilizations in order to gain insight into the origins 
of civilization, since even the most primitive forms of civilization had come in contact 
with modernity and could hence not be treated as an early form of human 
development. Wundt’s interpretation of the four “ages” of mankind showed, 
Durkheim continued, that he had not kept abreast of specialized research. He had 
misinterpreted totemism and ignored its religious and social character. In addition, 
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Wundt was not able to account for the sudden appearance of the “individual” during 
the age of “heroes and gods”. Most importantly, Wundt’s argument rested on 
assumptions of the philosophy of history which presupposed that mankind developed 
in a steady, uni-linear way towards a clear goal, “humanity”. Oddly in a study of 
Völkerpsychologie, Wundt had ignored national differences in his effort to present 
the history of mankind as one integrated process. In contrast, Durkheim explained, 
the history of civilization had to be compared to a tree with many related, but 
different branches. In sum, Durkheim concluded, Wundt’s study was too ambitious 
and had forced him to employ simplifying concepts. Despite these serious objections 
to Wundt’s study, however, he still found much to praise in it. Arguably, it was 
impossible for any individual scholar to answer all the questions that 
Völkerpsychologie raised. Wundt had done the best that was possible for an 
individual scholar, and whatever the “objective value” of his synthesis, it demanded 
the respect of the reader.69 When Marcel Mauss (1872-1950), Durkheim’s nephew 
and close collaborator, reviewed the volumes of Wundt’s ten-volume 
Völkerpsychologie devoted to his own specialism, myth and religion, for Ribot’s 
Revue philosophique, he came to similar conclusions: As “one of the last 
encyclopaedic minds in Germany”, Mauss wrote, Wundt’s work showed “the usual 
flaws of the philosopher – excessive systematization, hasty generalization, multiplied 
and complicated divisions”. But even specialists could profit from his work since he 
tried to clarify facts and define concepts that were frequently used, but often 
overlooked.70 Mauss praised Wundt’s study of the development of art, especially his 
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“genetic classification of various arts” and the distinction between “plastic arts” and 
“musics”. But Wundt, surprisingly, had not captured the social nature of art, but had 
tried to “explain history by individual psychology, by the general faculties of human 
consciousness”. Wundt had ignored the creation and the enjoyment of art, therefore 
his study had “no psychological life and no philosophical interest” because it was 
unrelated to “sociological reality”.71 Similarly, Wundt did not provide a clear 
understanding of “myth” because he had missed one of its essential elements, i.e. 
belief.  
Similar to Georg Simmel, who had appropriated central concepts of Lazarus’s 
Völkerpsychologie such as the “objective spirit”, Durkheim had made good use of 
concepts he had found early on in his career in Wundt’s philosophical writings. 
Durkheim did not simply borrow these concepts, but translated and reformulated 
them. What Wundt had called the “folk soul”, often misunderstood as a 
“metaphysical” definition of “national character”, Durkheim presented as “collective 
representations”. Where Wundt had taught that the “facts of moral life” had to be 
considered “social facts”, and that values, ideas and belief-systems had to be studied 
with the same rigorous methods as the material world, Durkheim couldn’t agree 
more. In contrast to Wundt, then, Durkheim did not try to write an all-encompassing, 
universal world history, but restricted himself to more limited topics, and avoided the 
temptation of an open teleology in the manner of Wundt. He put more effort into 
developing a universal methodology that would provide the means to study “society” 
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in a comprehensive way. Wundt, then, seems to have served Durkheim as much as an 
inspiration as a foil in his effort to establish a truly scientific sociology.72 
 
IV. 
Historians of psychology, their eyes fixed on the origins of “scientific” psychology, 
have regularly ignored the contribution of Völkerpsychologie to the development of 
their discipline.73 Despite recent attempts to include Völkerpsychologie into the 
history of the psychology on account of its resemblance to a holistic “cultural 
psychology”, historians of psychology continue to produce “useable pasts” of their 
discipline which play little attention to alternative, non-behaviourist approaches to 
the study of the mind.74 Similarly, historians of sociology and cultural anthropology 
do not consider Völkerpsychologie a part of the tradition that created their respective 
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disciplines, either.75 This reluctance to adopt Völkerpsychologie into the grand 
narratives of disciplinary development comes as no surprise since the term is 
commonly associated with simplified notions of “national character”, and with 
attempts to present national prejudices and stereotypes as serious and sound 
scholarship. Sometimes, Völkerpsychologie is even seen as a form of scientific 
racism.76 As a consequence, even historians of nationalism have dismissed the once 
venerable approach as little more than propaganda and have shown little interest in a 
“failed” discipline fraught with conceptual problems.77 
The French appropriation of German Völkerpsychologie helps to correct such 
entrenched views. There are several reasons that explain the popularity of German 
Völkerpsychologie in France. First, it reflected the “German crisis of French 
thinking” after the defeat of the French war of 1870-71 which provided its immediate 
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context. Followed by the collapse of the “second empire”, the civil war of the 
commune and the establishing of the Third Republic, this defeat caused a period of 
intensive soul-searching on the French part, and convinced many that the military 
defeat was due to the superior system of higher education in Germany, especially in 
Prussia.78 A number of French scholars and academics went on pilgrimages to 
German universities to study and learn from their alleged superiority, which led to a 
wave of intellectual transfers across the Rhine. The appropriation of 
Völkerpsychologie in France was part of this movement, and it remained a one-sided 
affair. Völkerpsychologie was most appealing to scholars who were trying to establish 
a proper science of the “social” that would go beyond that stale “individualism” then 
dominant in French departments of philosophy, and thus make a contribution to the 
study of contemporary, modern society. The Germans, it seemed to French observers, 
were well advanced in this regard. And while there was no lack of home-grown 
French attempts at formulating a social psychology in the guise of mass or crowd 
psychology, equally considered as one of the “precursors” of modern social 
psychology, German Völkerpsychologie offered French social scientists a welcome 
alternative to this approach, which was most successfully represented by Gustave Le 
Bon. Based on an elitist, anti-democratic outlook, Le Bon was generally suspicious of 
the importance the “crowd” had achieved in the modern age. He compared the 
behaviour of the foule to that of women, savages and children, who were all deemed 
incapable of rational thinking. Crowd psychology, then, was a barely disguised 
defence strategy of the rational, male individual against the onslaught of the 
democratic age that promised to emancipate previously excluded groups. As such, it 
had little in common with Völkerpsychologie, which was based on a positive, even 
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idealized view of the Volk as the origin of culture and civilization. Völkerpsychologie 
thus offered a perspective for those French authors who might have accepted the 
main tenets of Le Bon’s crowd psychology, but did not agree with the political 
ideology that underpinned it. Furthermore, Völkerpsychologie provided an 
alternative to the simplified theories of physical anthropology. While Lazarus, 
Steinthal and Wundt had not even engaged in a discussion of physical anthropology, 
but simply dismissed it as insufficient, Alfred Fouilée in particular employed 
Völkerpsychologie to this end. 
In addition, and in contrast to English-speaking countries, French academics 
and intellectuals had fewer problems with translating the peculiar German term 
Völkerpsychologie, which helped the transfer of German concepts to France 
considerably. The term itself could be rendered accurately as “psychologie des 
peuples” – keeping the plural of Völker, in contrast to the English translation “folk 
psychology”. However, only Fouillée used this literal translation “psychologie des 
peuples” emphatically and consistently. Ribot introduced it alongside “psychologie 
des races” and “psychologie ethnique”, and Bouglé, true to the Durkheim school, 
preferred to speak of “psychologie sociale”. Similarly, the awkward, but crucial term 
Volksgeist could be translated into French as “esprit national”, or, more liberally, as 
“esprit public”. This inconsistence in the use of the terminology of Völkerpsychologie 
was not merely a problem of translation, but one of definition: A number of German 
reviewers of Lazarus, Steinthal and Wundt had expressed their concerns about the 
suitability of the very label “Völkerpsychologie”. While agreeing with the general 
aims and outline of the new “discipline”, they found its name misleading, inaccurate 
or even pretentious. Most French readers of German Völkerpsychologie agreed with 
this view, and Durkheim made the most succesful suggestion when he introduced 
Wundt’s concept of a Volksseele as “representations collectives”. Even though 
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Durkheim agreed that the collective representations of each nation were distinct and 
unique – thus attesting the importance of the nation for his sociology – his free 
“translation” of Wundt’s term proved more successful than the German original with 
its romantic baggage. The level of abstraction of Durkheim’s terminology made its 
future popularity possible: It was in the works of the French “founding father” of 
sociology that the central concept of Völkerpsychologie survived, albeit in altered 
form and thus well hidden.79 
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